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INTRODUCTION
The United States economy is currently experiencing its eleventh
consecutive year of significant inflation if one assumes an inflationary
rate above 3 percent is significant. Even more frightening than this
long period of sustained inflation is the apparent inability of poli-
ticians and economists to find a lasting solution to the problem. This
would indicate a need on the part of investors to derive a technique for
investing in such an environment. This paper initially discusses what is
required for a company to be an inflation hedge and then, discusses the
conditions for alternative stocks to be Inflation hedges. Subsequently,
there is a brief review of the empirical evidence on the main points of
the theory. Following this, there i> an analysis of a lumber of industries
to determine which industries were inflation hedges. Finally, we examine
alternative industry stock price series to determine whether there is the
expected relationship between the performance by industries and the
relative returns on their stocks as implied by the theory.
*The authors acknowledge the data processing assistance of Roger Bent
and John Frothinghara and the use of the computer facilities at the Univer-
sity of Wyoming and the University of Illinois at Urbana -Champaign.
**The authors are Professor of Finance, University of Illinois at
Urbana -Champaign and Associate Professor of Accounting, Arizona State
University.

COMPANIES AS INFLATION HEDGES
A Valuation Model
As shown in detail by Millar and Modigliani [32], it is possible to
derive the value of a firm (or any economic unit) using earnings, cash
flow, or dividends. Although, several techniques are possible and
correct, it is likely that the most well-known valuation tnodel employed
is the present value of dividend approach first developed by John Burr
Williams in 1938 [55]. Specifically, it is contended that the value of
the common stock of a firm is the present value of all future dividend
payments on the stock as shown below
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where: Do * dividend rate during current period,
g " growth rate of dividends, and
k = discount rate for future dividends.
Given this basic value formulation, L t is then, typically shown that if
one assumes constant growth in dividends for an infinite period , this
model can be reduced to [52, 54]:
Present Value ~ -
—
K-g
Because of the rather unrealistic assumptions of constant growth
for an infinite period it may not be possible to u«?e this reduced formula
to derive an exact value for a firm or other economic unit. At the same
time, the formula d oes allow an analyst to determine the relevant valuation
variables. Then, given a projection of what: is going to happen to these

relevant variables, one can derive an expectation of the future direction
of values. As an example, if an analyst expected an increase in the
growth rate of dividends (g) and no other changes, he would expect an
increase in the value of the securities. While it may not be possible
to derive an exact future value, it is possible to know whether the ex-
pectation is favorable. As pointed out by Jahnke [21], the relevant con-
sideration regarding changes in value is changes in the spread between K
and g , i.e., if the spread between K and g increases there will be a
decline in security values, while a decline in the spread will result in
an increase in stock prices.
Factors Influencing K and &
To understand how inflation affects common stocks, it is necessary
to briefly consider what factors influence K and g. Basically, the
required return on common stocks (K) is initially a function of the return
available on risk-free investments (the RFR) . In addition, investors
require added returns to compensate for any uncertainty, i.e., referred
to as risk premium (R?). Finally, be luse investors are concerned with a
"real", increase in wealch, they want lo be compensated for any expected
inflation (I). This latter point deserves further elaboration. As an
example, assume that on the basis of the prevailing RFR and the perceived
risk of common stocks, the required return on common stocks is 8 percent.
It is contended that if subsequently investors came to expect the rate of
inflation to be 5 percent a year, they would increase their nominal required
rate to about 13 percent [ (l-HC) (1+1) - 1] in order that their "real"
return would be 8 percent. Therefore,
K = f(RFR; RP; I)

Determinants of Grow th . The growch rate of dividends (g) is
determined bj two major factors. Th' first factor is g owth in earnings
(GE) because earnings are the basic source of dividends. The second
factor is the dividend payout ratio (PO) . On a macro basis, the payout
ratio has been fairly stable over time which means the prime determinant
of g is earnings g r ow th because if the PO is constant then dividend
growth would equal earnings growth, i.e., g = GE . In turn, one can examine
earnings growth in one of two ways. First, one can conceive of GE as a
function of sales growth (SG) and the profit margin (PM). Given this
concept, if the profit margin is constant, earnings would grow in line
with sales. Unfortunately, as will be discussed, the PM is not a very
stable variable and is actually less stable than sales growth. Therefore,
the major analysis must be concerned with the analysis of the PM
.
An alternative framework for analyzing earnings growth is to view it
in terms of the return on equity (r) and the retention rate (b) similar
to what is done in the valuation of growth stocks [32]. As can easily
be shown, if one assumes an all-^quiLy firm, the long-run growth rate of
equity earnings will be r times b. Again, if one assumes that b is fairly
constant, the major emphasis should be on r. In turn r can be broken down
into equity turnover (sales/equity) and the profit margin (earnings /sales)
,
Therefore, this discussion can be summarized as follows:
g - f(GE; PO)
GE a f(SG; PM)
or
= f(r,b), but
r " f(ET; PM) so
GE - f(SG; PM; PO) or
GE - f(ET; PM; b)

inhere
g - growth in dividends
GE - growth in earnings
PO = payout ratio of dividends to earning
SG - saLes growth
PM = profit margin
r - return on equity
b = retention rate (1 - PO)
ET = equity turnover
The Effect of Inflation
Given these variables that influence K and g the question is, what
happens to K and g during periods of inflation? Regarding K, the effect
is fairly obvious and direct--K should increase by the rate of inflation !
If one feels that the inflation creates further uncertainties, one might
even expect the rate to increase by more than I because of an increase in
the RP.
The effect of inflation on g is not as obvious or certain. Given
this uncertainty one can postulate several alternative results for GE and,
therefore, different expectations for g. To simplify the discussion, the
analysis will use the growth function that includes SG, FM, and PO . In
addition, it is assumed that the PO is relatively stable over long periods
which is consistent with empirical results. These assumptions mak«? it
possible to concentrate the analysis on SG and the PK. The alternative
combinations of possibilities using nominal values are as follows:
1. Sales prices for the firm's products increase in line with the
rate of inflation and the profit margin:
A. Is constant

B. Declines
C. Increases
Sales prices for the firm's products increase by less than thi
rate of inflation and the PM.
A . Is constant
B. Declines
C
.
Increases
3. Sales prices for the firm's products increase by more than the
rate of inflation and the PM:
A. Is constant
B. Declines
C. Increases
The growth rate of nominal earnings will increase by at least the rate
of inflation (I) in the following cases: 1A S 1C S 3A, 3C . The growth rate
of earnings will definitely not increase by I in the following cases: IB,
2A , 2B. The effect, on GE and on g is uncertain in 2C and 3B.
Cases 3A , 3B, and 3C are included for completeness but these cases
are not considered very realistic, because if a firm could increase their
prices by more than the rate of inflation, one would expect the firm to
have done this prior to the inflation. If these three cases are ignored,
we are left with two cases where g will increase by a t least the rate of
inflation. Given such an effect on g the spread, K-g will either be con-
stant (if g increases in line with K) or the spread will decline (if g
increases by more than K) . Under such conditions, stock values will
either remain constant or increase.
In contrast, there are three cases in which g will not increase by
as much as K. In these instances the spread between K and g will increase
and stock values should decline. Finally, there is one case where the
change in g is uncertain because sales prices and the margin could counter-
act each other. Notably it is generally necessary that sales prices

increase in line with die rate of inflation. More important, it is neces-
sary that the profit margins either remain constant or increase during the
period of inflation if the growth rate of nominal earnings and nominal
dividends (g) is to increase by the same rate as the inflation rate. Only
under such conditions will the spread between K and g remain constant or
decline and stock values remain constant or increase. Therefore, a major
concern in the analysis should be consideration of what happens to the
economic unit's profit margin during periods of significant inflation ?
Regarding the question of whether profit margins should remain con-
stant or increase during periods of inflation, the implications of several
hypotheses have suggested that margins can improve during inflation. One
is the net debtor-creditor hypothesis which contends that economic units
that are net debtors (monetary liabilities exceed monetary assets) will
gain during periods of inflation at the expense of net monetary creditors
who have an excess of monetary assets. This theory has been tested on
several occasions and generally confirmed for firms that were net debtors
[13, 27, 53]. At the same time, it has also beer, shown by DeAlessi [12]
that prior to 1960 at least, only abouc one half of all U.S. firms were
net debtors, so it is questionable whether this hypothesis would be of
benefit for all firms taken as a unit.
Another hypothesis suggesting that firms will do well during periods
of inflation is known as the wage-lag hypothesis. It is contended that
during periods of inflation firms are able to raise the prices of their
goods or services immediately, while increases in wages are temporarily
deferred due to long-run wage contracts or a delay in the bargaining
process. Regarding the analysis of this question, Cargill [10] and Kessell

8and Alchian [20] have derived results which they feel show that the lag
does not exist. Alternatively, a discussion by Reilly [38, 39] indicates
that a wage-lag apparently exists, but that it is a short-run phenomenon
and only temporary . In either case, one would not expect the effect of
a wage-lag to be of long-run usefulness to firms.
Therefore, theory indicates that it is possible for firms to benefit
from inflation or at least to maintain their profit margin. Unfortunately,
the empirical evidence on the alternative hypotheses is not very encouraging
as discussed in detail in the Reilly monograph [39].
Common Stocks and Inflation
It is generally recognized that the performances by companies during
a period can differ significantly from the performance by the common stocks
of the companies [for a discussion of this see 40]. As an example, it is
not always true that the stock of a growth company will be a growth stock
(i.e., generate superior risk-adjusted returns). The same is true re-
garding inflation and common stocks--!. e. , it is possible for the stock
of a firm to be a good hedge even if the company is not a hedge ±f_ inves-
tors anticipate the inflation. In such a case, investors will adjust prices
prior to the onset of inflation and, therefore, returns during the period
of inflation will generate the required return [(1-rk) (1+I)-11]. In
contrast, if investors do not anticipate inflation, then one would not
expect the common stock of non-inflation hedge companies (i.e., companies
not able to hedge inflation by increasing g) to provide the necessary
returns during a period of inflation. Alternatively, firms that are
able to hedge against inflation (i.e., the spread between K and g is
either constant or declines) will provide the required return to their

stockholders to be a complete inflation hedge if the inflation is recognize
shortly after its onset (for an extensive graphical analysis of this point
see [39]).
In summary, if investors anticipate inflation all common stocks will
be a hedge against inflation during the period of inflation because stock
prices will be adjusted so that investors receive their required return.
In contrast, if investors do not anticipate inflation, it is important to
examine the ability of the company (or industry) to increase their growth
rate of dividends in line with the inflation. The discussion of the
factors influencing g indicated that such an increase in g requires that
the firm be able to raise prices in line with inflation, but more impor-
tant, that they be able to maintain their profit margin or increase their
profit margin during the period of inflation.
On Anticipating Inflation
The previous discussion indicates that it is important whether inves-
tors anticipate inflation. Sp ..lly, if investors anticipate inflatior
we should expect ail common stocks to be an inflation hedge during periods
of inflation. In contrast, if 'investors are not very good at anticipating
inflation, then it is important to examine the internal performance of
alternative economic units (industries in the current case) to determine
if they have been able to maintain their profit margin during the period
of inflation.
The question of whether common stock investors have anticipated in-
flation has not been examined directly. The available empirical evidence
on the general question of the ability of investors to anticipate infla-
tion and adjust their required rates accordingly is derived from several
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studies that have analyzed the relationship between interest rates and in-
flation to determine how long it has taken nominal interest rates to adjust
to changes in the rate of inflation.
The first rigorous test of the relationship was by Irving Fisher who
developed the distributed lag model to examine the lag [14]. Fisher con-
cluded that there was a definite relationship between interest rates and
price level changes, but interest rate changes tended to lag behind price
level changes . His estimate of the adjustment lag was quite long--about
10 years. The results of a subsequent study of the German hyperinflation
by Cagan were consistent with the Fisher results [9]. Such results would
indicate that investors did not anticipate inflation, and in fact, were
extremely slow in adjusting interest rates to inflation.
A study by Gibson was closely related to these studies and covered
the period 1869-1963 [20]. He was concerned with the adjustment period
and also the effect of term to maturity on the lag. Using annual data
the implied lag was qu ite l ong . Tests that used quarterly data provided
a somewhat shorter lag, but still over two years . The results also indi-
cated some impact of the term to maturity-- rt-term securities
adjust more rapidly than long-term securities. A study by Yohe and Kar-
nosky likewise examined the relation >etween nominal interest rate
changes and current and past price changes [56] . They examined monthly,
quarterly and annual data during the period 1952-1969. Their results in-
dicated a lag in the adjustment to price changes, but it was a shorter
lag than derived in prior s tudies--i . e . , most of the effect was felt within
a year . In addition, they found that the implied lag was even shorter
during periods of high inflation.

LI
A more recent study by Gibson attempted to examine the question by
measuring price change expectations more directly [19]. In contrast to
prior studies that used past price changes as an estimate of price ex-
pectations, Gibson used actual price change expectations as derived from
a survey of economists. The results indicated that interest rates respond
to price change expectations in about six months. lally, Cargill and
Meyer analyzed the relationship between statistical models [11]. Look-
ing at some recent data the results confirmed the Yohe and Karnosky results
that interest rates adjusted within six months to a year and also indi-
cated that the time period made a dif f erence--the adjustment is more
rapid during periods of significant inflation.
In summary, all the studies indicate that there is a lag in the ad -
justment of interest rates to changes in the rate of inflation . Some of
the recent studies indicate that the estimated lag is shorter than pre-
viously considered and the lag is reduced during periods of high inflation
because investors are more aware of it. In any case, on the basis of
available evidence it is necessary to conclude chat investors have not
anticipated inflation in making their Investment .decision.. Therefore,
one should not expect the common for all firms to be good inflation
hedges unless all companies are able to hedge against inflation by in-
creasing their growth rate of dividends during periods of inflation. As
noted, we should only expect companies to accomplish this if they are
able to increase sales prices, and/or maintain a constant profit margin,
or increase their profit margin during periods of significant inflation.
Evidence on Profit Margins
In the monograph by Reilly [39] there is a discussion of what should
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influence the profit margin as discussed by others --notably the debtor-
creditor hypothesis and the wage-lag hypothesis. As noted, the applica-
bility of these two factors is questionable because only about one half
of corporations are net debtors and the wage-lag is a short-run phenomenon.
To directly examine the question, there is an analysis of profit margins
over time beginning In 1947 when die data became available. The summary
of the direct analysis of profit margins [39. p. 39] indicates that the
status of the business cycle and the length of the period of inflation
must be considered when examining profit margin changes. Specifically,
it appears that companies can apparently maintain their profit margins
during the initial period of inflation, but the margins subsequently
decline. The inability to maintain profit margins is consistent with a
short -run wage lag. Notably, the only time when firms were able to in-
crease their profit margin was during 1950. During subsequent periods of
inflation it was generally constant the first year and declined thereafter.
Therefore, given that investors do not anticipate inflation and ag-
gregate profit margins have generally no_c_ been stable during periods of
significant inflation, one should not expect aggregate common stocks to
have performed very well during periods of significant inflation. Notably,
this expectation is not consistent with the folklore of Wall Street that
has always contended that common stocks should be good inflation hedges.
Evidence on Aggregate Common Stocks
During the last six years there have been a number of studies con-
cerned with testing whether common stocks as a group were a good hedge
against inflation [2, 4, 8, 23, 31, 35, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45, 46, 51].
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While there have been, some partial differences in conclusions because of
the analysis of different time periods, it is safe to say that the great
bulk of the work has indicated chat common stock? have not been a good in-
flation hedge during period s of significant inflation. This conclusion is
based upon an analysis of a broad cr ection of U.S. common stocks dur-
ing all periods of significant 1; on (defined as a period when the
rate of inflation has 3 percent, or more) . The aggregate market analysis
considered returns before and after taxes. In addition, an analysis of
the performance by a sample of major individual stocks confirmed these
results. The lone exception for all the periods of inflation examined
was 1950-51 when the aggregate market and almost all individual stocks
were complete inflation hedges. This "unique" performance in 1950-51
is consistent with the prior discussion on the importance of maintain-
ing or increasing the profit margin. Recall that this was the only
period examined when the aggregate profit margin increased. An exten-
sive discussion of a number of these studies is contained in Reilly [39].
A Reminder
Notably, the theory and the empirical results do not indicate that
common stocks can never be an inflat Ige, it simply says that it is
difficult and not very likely for all stocks in the aggregate. More
important for the current study, the theory and empirical evidence cer-
tainly does not imply that even though all common stocks as a group are
not inflation hedges, that some common stocks could not be hedges. The
point is, a certain proportion of firms may be able to maintain or im-
prove their profit margins during periods of significant inflation because
of their capital structure, their labor contracts, or the nature of their
cost structure (i.e., heavy fixed costs). This latter possibility is
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obviously crucial to the current study because the intent is to search
for alternative industries that have been inflation hedges based upon an
analysis of their profit margins and determine if the stocks of these in-
dustries that have been i Lon hedges based upon av. analysis of their
profit margins and determine if the stocks of these industries have like-
wise been good hedges against i Lon.
THE CURRENT STUDY
The Hypothesis
It is hypothesized that during periods of significant inflation
there will be a correlation between the earnings performance by indus-
tries that are able to hedge against inflation (as indicated by the trend
of their profit margin) and the performance of the stock of these indus-
tries .
Test Procedure
The test procedure involves three major steps as follows:
1. Analyse a number of industries before and during past periods
of significant inflation to determine what happened to their
profit margin during the period of inflation. As noted, we
would contend that industries able to maintain or increase
their profit margins curing the periods of inflation were able
to hedge inflation as an industry. Therefore, even if one
assumes the inflation was not anticipated, one would not
expect the common stock of these industries to suffer.
2. Analyze the stocks of alternative industries to determine their
performance during periods of significant inflation. To
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determine whether the stocks from given industries would have
been inflation, hedges, we examined the annual, returns for each
total period of inflation, and a - ed average for all
periods of inflation, These individual nominal
,
returns were
adjusted for the rates of g each year to derive
a real race of returt . real rates of return were compared
to the average real race of return on all industrial common
stocks on the NYSE durin period 1946-1972 as indicated
by the average real return on the Standard and Poor's 425.
Also, the real returns during the periods of significant in-
flation were compared to the real rate of return derived for
each particula r Ind us try during this total period 1946-72.
This latter comparison is intended to take unique industry re-
turns into account.
3. Finally, there is a comparison of the industry performance to
the performance by the industry stocks. Our hypothesis implies
a positive correlation betwee two performances.
Data. Used
The industry analysis employed data contained in the Standard and
Poor's Ana lys ts Hand book . The Handbook contaiiis composite corporate per
share data by industry for 88 industries. Because we needed complete data
sets for the period 1946-1972, eight industries were dropped. In addition,
if an industry had a deficit during one of the inflation years we could
not compute a percent change in the margin so other industries had to be
dropped. The final sample varied from 72 to 75 industries.
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Specific Analysis
The data are available from 1946 Since this time, there have been
three periods of significant inflation: 1950-51; 1956-57: 1966-72. Al-
though the latest period of inflation has obviously continued to the
present, the analysis was ended in 1972 due to dats availability vhen
the study was begun. During each year, we determined what happened to
the net profit margin during the year (e.g.. from 1949-1950). In addition
to the individual year changes, we computed a simple average of the
changes (referred to as the average change). There was also a deter-
mination of the total change from the year before the inflation to the
ending year of the inflation (i.e., 1949 to 1951). This total change
was divided by t.^o and is referred to as a composite change.
The nomimal rates of return vere computed for every industry using
beginning and ending stock prices and the dividends for the year. We also
derived the real rates of return using the rate of inflation for each of
the years (R* - (1 + R)/(l + I) -1). The average annual rate for the
total period of inflation was computeu using the beginning and ending
prices and all dividends. Given this nominal rate of return we computed
a real return and finally a net return which is equal to the real return
minus a market -determined normal return (K) . The normal return used is
the Fisher return for New York Stock Exchange securities over the period
1926-1960 adjusted for inflation during that same period [ 16 J . The result
is a long-run real return on stocks of 8.2 percent. Therefore, the net
return is equal to the industry's real return less 8.2 percent. As noted
in prior studies [23, 38, 39, 44, 45, 46] a positive R 1 during a period
of inflation ,v'Ould indicate that the industry is a "traditional" inflation
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hedge. More important, a positive net return would indicate that the in-
dustry was a complete inflation hedge. Specifically, a positive net return
indicates that the investor received his normal return (K - 8.2 percent)
after ad jus ting for inflation.
Finally, because of unique industry factors one might expect the
required return for alternative industries to differ. To examine this
possibility, ve computed the retes of return for each of the industries
for the period 1946-1972 using the beginning and ending stock prices and
all dividends. Given this nominal return, we derived a real return for
each industry. This real industry return for the period 1946-72 is
referred to as KI . This KI figure was used to derive a net industry
return unique to each industry (R 1 - KI)
.
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
A major point of the current study is that the performance be alter-
native industries can differ during periods of significant inflation.
Moreover, the performance of the common stock is expected to differ based
upon the ability of the industry to increase their growth rate as reflected
in changes in the profit margin. Therefore, in the discussion of the
results we will emphasize the differential performance by industries and
also the relationship between the stock performance and profit margin
changes
.
1950-51 Inflation
As noted previously, the overall performance of common stocks during
the 1950-51 period of inflation was very good. A lot of this performance
can be explained by the outstanding performance by industries during this
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period as indicated by changes in the profit margins --especially during
1950. As can be seen in Table 1, the average percent increase in the net
profit margin during 1950 was 22.39 percent. There was also a wide range
of performance , from a decline cf 32 percent to an increase of 281 percent.
Further, there were 19 industries that experienced declines in their mar-
gins during the year.
During 1951 there was a sharp reversal in the profit margin performance
as one might expect based upon the prior discussion of the short-run nature
of the wage-lag hypothesis. Again there was a wide dispersion in the
profit margin changes ranging from a decline of almost 91 percent to an
increase of about 10 percent, with an average decline of 24 percent. Five
industries experienced increases in the face of the overall decline.
For the total period the results ranged from a decline of 45 percent
to an increase of 94 percent. While there was an average decline of
about 3 percent, there were 20 industries that experienced an increase.
The average rates of return on the industry stocks during 1950-51
were very good on average, but likewise indicated wide dispersion. For
the total period the real rates of return varied from minus 18 percent to
positive 53 percent. Although the average R ! was over 15 percent, there
were 12_ industries with negative real retjrns . Further, while the average
net return adjusted for the 8.2 percent was a very respectable 7.5 percent,
there were 2_8_ industries that had negative net returns --i .e . , were not
complete inflation hedges. Therefore, it seems appropriate to say that
although the average performance was quite good, there was wide dispersion
among industries.
Table 2 contains the Spearman Rank-Order correlation coefficients
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among the major profit margin figures and stock price returns. Specifieally,
the rank-order correlation between profit ~
.
changes and stock price
returns during 1950 was .461, and during 1951 it was .518. Both of these
are significant az the .001 level. For the total period the relationship
between R' and the average change was .468 and between R' and the com-
posite change was .474. Therefore, one can conclude that there was a
significant positive relationship in the ranking of industry returns and
profit margin changes as hypothesized.
1956-57 Inflation
The rate of inflation during 1956-57 was not as high as during 1950-
51, but it still was significant based upon the long-run pattern. This
period also differed from 1950-51 in that the performance by the aggregate
stock market was quite pocr--there were generally negative nominal rates
of return and large negative real returns and net returns as can be seen
in Table 3. Even so, as will be discussed, the performance by alternative
industries varied widely.
The average increase e profit margin during 1956 was less than
1 percent. While the aggregate indicated almost no change, the range was
from minus 31 percent to plus 75 percent. Thirty-eight industries had
increases and 37 experienced declines.
During 1957 there was an average decline in the margin of 7 percent
ranging from minus 47 percent to an increase of 39 percent. There were
18 industries tna t enjoyed an increase in the margin. The two year
changes showed small average declines, the range was from about minus
30 percent to plus 30 percent, and about one-third of the industries
experienced increases
.
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The average rates of return on the industry stocks during 1956 was
positive for both the nominal and real rates. The range of real returns
was from minus 27 percent to a plus 64 percent. Even with the positive
average return values, there were 42 industries that experienced negative
real returns. In 1957 the average returns were negative and the real
returns ranged from about minus 46 percent to plus 27 percent. In this
instance, there were L9 industries with positive real returns.
The average annual nominal and real returns for the two year period
were both negative. Again though, the diffuse nature of the results for
alternative industries can be seen by the fact that the real returns
ranged from minus 29 percent to plus 29 percent and there were 25 in-
dustries with positive real returns. In fact, there were 5 industries
with positive net returns indicating that they ,;ere complete inflation
hedges during this period .
As shown in Table 4, with the exception of 1956, there was significant
positive corr lation between the rank ngs of profit margin changes and
real returns. Specifically, the Spearman rank -order correlation between
profit margin changes and real returns during 1956 was .148. In contrast
the comparable relationship during 1957 was a very significant .491. For
the combined period the correlations were .403 and .434.
In summary, it appears that industry performance does vary widely
during periods of significant inflation. In addition, the correlation
results indicate that information regarding changes in the profit margin
for alternative industries would be of value in ranking the industry stock
returns
.
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1966-19 72 Inflation
An analysis of the recent period of inflation which is continuing is
most difficult because it is so long and actually there have been several
changes in the level of inflation above 3 percent. Specifically, the
rates of inflation during each of the years is as follows (from December
to December of each year):
1966 3.3 5 19 70 5.49
1967 3.04 1971 3.36
1968 4.72 1972 3-41
1969 6.11
As can be seen, the rate of inflation was very steady in 1967 com-
pared to 1966, then increased substantially in 1968, and again in 1969,
a recession year. Subsequently, during 1970, the second year of the
recession, the rate of inflation declined somewhat and in 1971 and 1972
it declined substantially with the introduction of Phase 1 and Phase II
which was in effect until January, 1973. The point is, this period is
not the typical period of inflation where prices rise and then fall in
one wave. Also, the economic recession of 1969-70 must be considered*
Regarding changes in the profit margin, the first two years are
fairly typical. During 1966 the average change was quite close to zero
with a fairly wide range. In 1967 the average change was a negative 8.57
percent which is consistent with the prior second years of inflation.
Again, there was a wide range in the performance and 18 industries enjoyed
increases in their margin. In 1968 there was a small positive change as
the rate of inflation increased substantially. In 1969 there was another
large increase in the rate of inflation and the beginning of a business
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recession. Therefore, the 1969 average decline of 7 percent could be
attributed to the second year of a new segment of the inflation or the
new recession. The average decline during 1970 was 11 percent but the
range was from minus 7 7 percent to plus rcent and included 19
industries chat had increases, Finally } during 1971 and 1972 the rate
of inflation declined substantially;, the economy was in the initial phase
of a business recovery, and profit margins generally increased.
As usual there was a wide range of changes including 35 industries that
suffered declines during 1971 and 18 industries that experienced lower
profit margins in 1972.
The total period results indicated an overall decline in profit
margins during the period with a range from about minus 10 percent to
plus 10 percent. Actually, during the total period from 1965 to 1972
only 12 industries experienced an increase in their profit margin. Such
a result indicates that in the aggregate business firms are not able to
hedge against inflation because overall profit margins decline during
periods of significant inflation. Trsis is confirmed by a separate
analysis of the relationship between annual profit margins and the rate
of inflation for the period 1946-1974. The correlation was a small
negative value. When the profit margin employed was profits as
a percent of GNP the correlation was a larger negative number.
Indus try Rates of Return
The average rates of return varied widely during the total period
and also che alternative industries differed during each year. The average
real return during 1966 was negative in line with the increase in infla-
tion and a small decline in the margin. The average return was positive
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during 1967 as the inflation r abilized even though the profit margin
declined. In 1968 the rate of inflation increased but so did profit
margins and average returns were Lye. During 1969 and 1970 the
rate of inflation increased, profit margins declined and average stock
returns were negative. Finally in 1971 and 1972 the rate of inflation
declined, profit margins increased and stock prices increased. In gen-
eral, it appears that although the rates of return varied during the
period, they were consistent with expectations based upon the valuation
model. As usually, there was a wide range in the rate of return performance
by alternative industries --the typical range during a given year was 65
percent to about 100 percent.
Profit Margins and Rates of Return
The Spearman rank-order correlations between profit margin changes
and real rates of return are contained in Table 6. The results vary by
individual years, but were quite good for the total period. Specifically,
the correlations were very significant positive values having 1966, 1969,
1970, and 1971. Obviously 1966 was the first year of the new period of
significant inflation. 1969 was a year when the rate of inflation in-
creased, and the average margin declined and stocks on average did poorly.
The second year of the recession, 1970 was marked by a decline in margins
and higher inflation. Finally, 1971 was an economic recovery year and
margins increased- Therefore, it appears the relationship is best during
years of major changes in the economy and in the rate of inflation.
The total period correlation results were very significant and the
better results were derived using the composite change in profit margin
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figure. Therefore, there Is support for the hypothesis that there is a
positive relationship between industLies that can hedge against inflation
by maintaining their profit margin and industries that are good inflation
hedges for their investors.
Another way to consider these results is in terms of hypothetical
portfolio returns. There were 12 Industries that enjoyed increased in their
margins during this period. If an Investor owned this portfolio of stocks
during the total period of inflation, his average real return would have
been 7.5 percent compared to the average of ail industries of 2.3 percent.
The average net return would have been -0.7 percent compared to the av-
erage net return for all industries of -5.90 percent. This group of 12
industries that had increases in their margin included six of the 11
industries that had positive net returns for the period. The 11 industries
that were complete inflation hedges for the total period were:
* 1. Beverages --Brewers 7. Machinery and Services --
2. Beverages -"Distillers Oil Well
* 3. Beverages --Soft I jinks 8. Retail Stores --Variety
4. Coal --Bituminous . res
* 5. Drugs * 9. Shoes
* 6. Finance Companies * 10. Soaps
11. Tobacco -Cigarette Mfrs.
* These industries experienced increases in their profit
margins
,
MMARY AND CONCLUSION
Summary
The purpose of the study was to discuss why common stocks could be
an inflation hedge with the idea that not all stocks would react the same
to inflation because all companies and industries do not react the same.
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There was an extensive discussion of why firms might be able to hedge
against inflation, but it was noted tat the necessary conditions (net
debtor; wage lag) were not present for ail firms. Therefore, unless
investors anticipate inflation one shi >ect all firms to gain
from inflation or be able to hedge against inflation. It was then noted
that, based upon extensive studies of bond yields it must be concluded
that investors do not anticipate inflation. Hence it becomes important
to be aware of what factors indicate whether economic units have been
able to hedge against inflation by increasing their growth rate of earn-
ings and dividends in line with the increase in the rate of inflation.
It was shown that a crucial variable is the ability to maintain or in-
crease the profit margin during inflation. Therefore, it was hypothesized
that during periods of significant inflation there should be a wide dis-
persion in the profit margin performance by alternative industries and
also a significant difference in the stock price performance by a sample
of industries. Specifically, it was hypothesized that there would be a
significant positive relationship between profit margin changes and stock
price changes.
The Standard and Poor's industries were examined during the chree
recent periods of significant inflation: 1950-51; 1956-57; and 1966-72.
The results differed by period in that th arket results were
quite good during 1950-51, but were rather poor during the subsequent
periods. More important for the hypothesis, there was very wide dispersion
in the profit margin performance and the stock market performance during
each of the total periods of inflation. The relationship was not always
significant during individual years, but the total period results were
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always very significant.
Conclusion
Extensive prior analysis has indicated that aggregate common stocks
have not been good inflation hedges during periods of significant infla-
tion. The discussion here and elsewhere has contended that the aggregate
results would not necessarily have to apply to all companies and industries
because it is possible for some of them to have the ability to hedge
against inflation. The results herein definitely confirm r.he wide dis-
persion in performance that is possible. It also indicates the importance
of examining changes in the profit margin as an indicator of potential
stock price performance.

TA 8LE 1
Summary Statistics for Profit Margins
and Rates of Return Juring 1950 and 1951
Mean
s td
.
Dev. High Lov? Skew
Percent: Change in Prof. Mavg.
1950
19,1
1950-51 Ave. Change
1950- il Comp. Change
22. 9 44. • 281 .AT - 2.20 3.55
.74.46 15.37 9.80 -90.85 - .93
1.0' 24.16 128. 5A -38.92 3.00
3.44 21.26 9A.29 -A4.83 2.70
Annual Rates of Return
* i mSim—m—~"»-m^——
*
1950
-R
1950
-R'
1951-R
1951-R'
1950-51 Ave R
1950-51 Ave R'
1950-51 R'-K
1950-51 R'-KI
Y.I -1946 -1972
29.53 25.65 78.89 -19.21 .01
22.40 2A.24 69.03 -2^.66 .01
16.86 15.46 52.28 - 6.83 .69
10.39 14.61 48.57 -11.99 .69
22.47 15.55 62.38 -13.36 .0A
15.71 14.69 53.42 -18. 1A .0A
7.51 14.69 45.22 -2634 .0A
7.23 12.89 A0.52 -18.17 .16
9. A3 3.32 17. ^A 2.6A .21
.) •,
•
• ..;ti.
TABLE 2
Spearman Rank-Order Correlations Among
Profit Margin Changes and Real Rates of Return
1950-1951
APM APM Ave APM Comp APM R 1 R'
50 51 50-51 50-51 50 51
APM-1950 --
APM-1951 .096 --
Ave aPM-1950-51 .844 .520 —
Comp APM-19S0-51 .751 .635 .981 --
-V-1950 .461 .119 .394 .360 —
R'-1951 .069 .518 .300 .361 .099 —
R»-Ave Ann 1950-51 .390 .369 .468 .474 .868 .552
R ' -Ave
Ann 50-51

TABLE 3
Summary Statistics for Profit Margins
and Rates of Return Ouring 1956 and 1957
Percent Change in Profit Margin
1956
1957
1956-57 Ave. Change
1956-57 Corap. Change
Mean
Std.
Dev. High Low Skew
0.66 17.48 75.07 -31.11 1.27
-7.04 14.37 39.01 -47 . 14 - .34
-3.19 10.74 29.89 -32.46 .78
-3
. 34 10.57 34.02 -27.22 1.13
Annual Rates of Return
19%-R
1956
-R'
1957
-R
1957
-R'
i.956-57 Ave R
1956-57 Ave R'
1956-57 R'-K
1956-57 R'-KI
9.19 20.00 68.32 -24.69 .93
6.12 19.44 63.59 -26.81 .93
10.64 17.95 30.75 -45.28 .24
13 .26 17.43 26.93 -46.88 .24
2.15 10.93 33.37 -27.34 .30
4.96 10.62. 29.55 -29.42 .30
13.16 10.62 21.35 -37.62 .30
14.33 9.80 12.21 - 6.64 .35

Table 4
Spearman Rank-Order Correlations Among
Profit Margin Changes and Real Rates of Return
1956-1957
APM APM Ave APM Comp APM * ? R f
56 57 56-57 56-57 56 57
APM-1956 --
APM- 19 5 7 -.106 —
Ave APM-1956-57 .620 .587 --
Comp APM-1956-57 .624 .590 .994 --
R'-1956 .148" -.028 .069 .072
R'-1957 .065 .491 .384 .410 -.318 —
R'-Ave Ann 1956- 57 .194 .421 .403 .434 .489 .611
R'-Ave
Ann 56-57

Table 5
Summary Statistics for Profit Margins and
Rates of Return )uring 1966-197?
Percent Change in Profit Margin
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1966-72 Ave. Change
1966-72 Cotnp. Change
Mean
Std.
Oev
.
High Lw Skew
-
.89 10.75 41 . 53 -26.01 .63
-8.57 13.23 24.40 -66 . 50 -.89
1.28 26.91 207.63 -33.89 6.33
-7.28 13.19 27.81 -50.7 r> - .25
-11.24 21.30 50.00 -77.27 - .34
5.05 31.09 148.39 -51.25 1.94
9.87 24.28 129.09 -43.48 1.84
-1.68 4.97 20.87 -10.95 1.44
-2.98 3.57 9.78 - 9.42 1.0C
Annual Rates of Return
1966
-R'
1967
-R'
1968-R'
1969-R'
1970
-R'
197 1-R'
1972
-R'
1966 -72
-Ave Ann R
1966 -72
-Ave Ann R*
1966-72-R'-K
1966-72
-R'-KI
-15.20 12.97 25.05 -40.91 .59
27.96 19.78 82.29 -11.86 .46
16.38 18.55 76.04 -15.69 .89
-14.20 15.83 "*7.76 -46.69 .75
- 1.68 16.54 46.83 -54.20 -.27
13.59 18.54 66.57
-n.77 -.10
8.12 18.05 70.53 -38.51 -.38
6.61 6.40 29.14 - 4.67 .72
2.30 6.14 23.92 - 8.52 .72
- 5.90 6.14 15.72 -16.72 .72
- 7.29 6.50 9.01 -22.83 .22

TABLE 6
Spearman Raak-Order Correlations Between
Profit Margin Changes and Real Rates of Return
1966-1972
1966
.330
1967
.128
1968 .057
1969 .472
1970 .227
1971 .316
1972 .173
Ave APM-R' (1966-72) .340
Comp APM-R 1 (1966-72) .580
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